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TheprimarygoalofthisstudyistoidentifythefactorsinJapaneseaidpoliciesthat
havebroughtabouttheactiveparticipationofJapaninthereconstructionofEastern
Europe".AlthoughmuchattentionhasbeenpaidtoOfficialDevelopmentAssistance
(ODA)distributedtocountriesofatraditionalstrategicimportanceforJapan(suchas
thoseofAsiaandtheMiddleEast),thetopicofaidgiventoEasternEuropehasbeen
neglectedforalongtime.Inthislight,amoreprofoundandthoroughinvestigation
ofthisproblemisofspecialimportanceatthepresenttime.
Accordingly,centralquestionsaddressedinthispaperare:whatfactorsmost
influencedthedecisionfordisbursementofJapaneseaidtoEasternEurope?;andwhat
couldbetheprimarymotiveandeventualbenefitsexpectedbyJapaninthisdiplomati
.ic
quest,whichcanrationalizetheseaidpolicies?
Insearchofanswerstothesequestions,theauthorexaminesthreepossiblefactors
thathaveplayedanessentialroleindeterminingthepatternsoftheJapaneseaid
policies.Firstly,externalpressureisexaminedasbeingthemostsignificantfactorof
aidpoliciesduringtheColdWar.Secondly,thegrowinginfluenceofpublicorinternal
pressureonJapaneseODApoliciesduringthe1990swillalsobediscussedasapossible
explanatorymodel.Finally,emphasisisgiventotheoverwhelmingimportanceofthe
nationalinterestdebateinaidpoliciesthroughthelasttwodecades,aswellasits
explicitexpressionincontemporaryJapanesediplomacy.Thesewillbeanalyzedas
threeexplanatorymodelsforaidinEasternEurope.
Herein,theauthorsuggeststhatthenationalinterestdebate,asanexpressionofa
rationalactormodel,isthestrongestfactorthathasdeterminedaidpoliciestowards
EasternEurope.Furthermore,theauthorwilltrytojustifythisargumentby
examiningtherationalesofJapaneseaidintheregion.
1. Three exp一anatory research models
The first part of this study will discuss the main factors that determined Japanese
1 ) The term 'Eastern Europe'refers to as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
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aid policies in the late 1980s and through the 1990s. In accordance with our research
question, the author discusses three models of explanation about possible factors that
have influenced Japanese aid policies, applying the theoretical framework of Kenneth
Waltz and his "levels of analysis''　In our case, whereas foreign pressure will be
outlined as a second-image reversed model, and internal pressure will constitute ,a
second-image model, national interests will express the behavior of a rational actor in
the international system.
1.1 Second-Image Reversed Model: The external pressure on Japanese ODA
Gaiatsu, or the external (foreign) pressure on Japan with regard to its foreign
policy, has been referred to as one of the substantial factors for determining Japanese
ODA. The strong dependence of Japanese aid policies, particularly during the Cold
War, finds its roots in the specifically determined pattern of U.S.-Japan relations. As
Miyashita argues, the dependence of Japanese ODA policies stems from the
asymmetrical relations between the two countries left over from the Cold War, namely
military protection of Japan provided by the U.S and Japanese dependence on the
American market (Miyashita, 2003, pl5). Japan could be described as a state dependent
on international trade as a main source of activity and national growth. Its survival
was, therefore, seen as closely related to access to external markets and a peaceful
security environment. The main provider for these two crucial commodities during the
Cold War was the U.S. with its military and economic capabilities. In this respect,
Japanese desire to avoid a major disruption of U.S.-Japan relations often led Tokyo to
back down from its original position when the two countries were at odds on given
policy issues concerning ODA. Some critics such as Miyashita argue that although
Japan was capable of formulating its own independent policies based upon its own
definition of national interest, whether or to what extent it would pursue such policies
depended on the strength of U.S. objection (Miyashita, 2003, p25).
Amongst the authors that have touched upon the problem of external pressure,
Robert Orr and Dennis Yasutomo have broadly observed the issue and provided two
,.________._________..___一一一一一一一一一一一一・一一・・一llllllllll・一一一一一一一一一一一一・一・・・一
2 ) The framework of Waltz (1965) with its three levels is a classical tool to identify and to analyze the root
of international politics. There has been, however, another image introduced by Peter A. Gourevitch
(1978: 881-912), 'the second-image reversed'. In contrast to the "classical second image" that has roots in
a domestic political system, where policies are influenced from the inside, the "second-image reversed
provides its explanation through external influences that formulate these policies.
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competing assertions (Orr, 1990; Yasutomo, 1995). Generally, whereas Orr underlines
the reactive role of Japan and its "subordination" to Washington's strategies,
Yasutomo downplays external pressure as a major determinant of Japanese aid. He
claims that Japan had its own agenda and strategy in its pursuit of foreign aid
policies (Yasutomo, 1995). Thus, Yasutomo takes approach of the Japanese government
as a rational actor, which implies a more centralized position in its decision-making.
Tokyo was more capable of defining its 'national interest'and pursued more consistent,
proactive and autonomous foreign policies throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s.
This paper supports Yasutomo's main assertion about the new proactive and
independent aid diplomacy of Japan3', but it will utilize a different case study to prove
this point. To justify this argument, the author proves this assumption to be correct
using the case of Eastern Europe.
According to Miyashita, there are generally three types of pressure the U.S.
exercises on Japan. These are "confluence of interests", "conflict of interests" and
neither con fluent nor conflictive" issues (Miyashita, 2003). Japanese aid policies
towards the former Soviet Union after 1991 were highly influenced by U.S. pressure.
As far as the case of Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe is concerned, however,
foreign pressure shows no evidence of having worked. Although the Eastern European
region accounted for only a small part of the total ODA amount, it was still an
important development in the early 1990s according to Japanese magazines such as
Gaiko Forum (1989-94) or Keidanren Monthly (1989-96). The U.S. paid enough attention
to these former communist countries, but astonishingly it followed its own agenda and
did not push Japan into further involvement.
The fact is that none of the sources used for this paper and for the further research
of the author indicate any interference of foreign pressure from the U.S. side in this
particular case. Neither did a series of interviews with officials from Japanese MOFA,
JICA and JBIC4. In this sense, one can observe that Miyashita's categorization of
foreign pressure is incomplete, or it lacks the essential category of "lack of foreign-''''''''''''''T
3) Yasutomo's argument rests upon the discussion over Japan's participation in the international
development banks, such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. It proved Japanese aid policies to be far more proactive than suggested
by Orrs theory.
4 ) The author conducted the interviews in July 2005.
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pressure". Apart from the presumption of a "lack of- foreign pressure', the Eastern
European case can be regarded only as either a peculiar "confluence of interests from
both sides, or as a category in which both players share common implicit interest,
based on a silent cooperation for common purposes.
1.2 Second-Image Model: The Internal Pressure on Japanese ODA
The internal pressure from the public became significant in the late 1980s and the
1990s. It can be overviewed via two main directions. The first one is international, with
the public itself having declared the desire for Japan to participate in broader
contributory activities . The Japanese public had indicated that Japanese aid is not
sufficient and further stated its will for Japan to contribute internationally by the
means of market opening言nitiatives for system building and international agreements,
cooperation with the UN, technical cooperation, ODA, etc. This contribution has to be
seen as a responsibility of Japan as a great economic power, increasing its influence or
reputation. 6
As a second direction of internal pressure, in the early 1990s, public opinion started
to become critical of the lack of information and publicity about diplomacy, especially
regarding aid policies in which the main source of resources was taxpayers savings.
Additionally, this criticism was towards the poor aid policies without any certain
principles. The phenomenon of harsh public criticism was not limited only to Japan,
but also manifested itself within the broader process of the aid-tiredness wave that
took over most of the big donor countries (Watanabe and Miura, 2003, ppl8-19).
It may be argued at length about significance of the public opinion m forming aid
policies. It is as disputable how strong the trace of the public was in enhancing Japan's
proactive participation車n the world-a trend visible in the 1990s. Specifically in the case
of Eastern Europe, one can point out the significance of public opinion in encouraging
further and deeper involvement and participation of Japan in the creation of the new
international system after 1989. However, it would be inaccurate for one to claim that
the public was main cause for aid towards Eastern Europe. Moreover, the necessity of
5 ) Such tendencies have been shown by various surveys, such as that of Keidanren Monthly (January, 1993).
6 ) Some critics argue, however, that the reason for the broad support of eventual increases of Japanese
ODA within the framework of international contribution, may be found in the will of citizens to
constrain possible military expenditures, rather than in any broad public knowledge or understanding
about ODA policies (Nuscheler, 1992).
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a paper about the Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe stems from the fact that the
broad Japanese public often casts doubts over the rationale of Japanese aid towards
regions beyond traditional interest, such as Eastern Europe.
In contrast to the weakened position of foreign pressure being a factor, internal
pressure is an increasingly powerful motor for Japanese aid policies. It can be,
however, considered mainly as a secondary or supplementary factor in the case of
Eastern Europe, because it had influenced the case indirectly through Japanese public
demands for reforms of ODA and broader contribution and involvement in global
issues. In contrast, the next section will consider possibly the strongest factor of
Japanese aid policies towards Eastern Europe-the national interest debate.
1.3 Rational Actor Model: Japanese National Interest Debate
When completing a general survey of Japanese aid policies in the 1990s, one cannot
omit the debate concerning how national interest was embedded in new strategies for
aid policies. This paper claims herein that the national interest debate, determinative
for the diplomatic agenda, plays a stronger part, and rather overshadows the question
of external and internal pressure in Japanese foreign aid policies.
Furthermore, the national interest debate implies the rational actor model for our
analysis. The rational actor model explains purposeful behavior: an actor is behaving
rationally if his choices are designed to achieve outcomes that are con声istent with his
goals (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, ppl3-75) . This model will help us trace the
motivational process for initiating aid policies towards Eastern Europe.
The definition of 'national interest'has been broadly discussed by different schools
and in various works such as those of Hans Morgenthau, David Clinton, Martha
Fmnemore, etc. The use of national interests in a narrow 'nationalistic'sense has led
to the tragedies of the two world wars. In fact, after the Second World War in
particular, the defeated countries like Japan avoided terms such as　-national interest一一
or 'strategy', which are closely related to the mass destructive effect of the wars. This
has given the wrong impression that these countries have no strategic view towards
world developments and do not emphasize the significance of the national interests.
7 ) There are four key concepts to analyze in order to determine the cause of a nation's actions: the goals
and objectives of the nation, the options, the consequences, and the choice the nation has made.
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In the changing realities of the 1990s, Japan gained momentum to state its national
strategy and interests freely. Officials discussing Japanese foreign policy and aid
policies in particular were increasingly using the term 'national interest'包. In this
regard, it has been said on a number of occasions that the reforms of Japanese ODA
are linked to the closer evaluation of Japanese national interests in the bubble
economy period and lasting stagnation in the 1990s. Japanese ODA policies were
reassessed in accordance with the occurrence of the national interest debate as a major
factor in determining aid policies.
National interest may have many roots and faces such as economic, political,
strategic or even spiritual interests. Yoshn and Tsukimura point out that Japanese
national interests are expressed in the security and economic dimensions (JICA
Institute for International Cooperation, 2003a). One can argue, however, that this
categorization is incomplete.
Apart from security and the economic national interests, there are other, third and
fourth dimensions- namely, the broader 'enlightened interests and political interests'.
The 'enlightened interests'go further and touch upon common international interests,
as the sum of global security and common well-being-. As some official discussions
define it, it is the indirect and long lasting approach that takes into a∝ount the
mutuality expressed m the respect of the self-interest of the other countries. In
comparison with the narrow and direct national interests expressed in the security
dimension, the enlightened interests aim at contribution to the international economic
system or the sustamability of the international order, to the development of poorer
countries and to their democratization, which ultimately benefits not only other
countries, but also the benefactor itself.
On the other hand, the political national interests go through the political credit a
country gams by its activities. By helping developing nations and those in trouble, and
establishing close and friendly ties with甲any of them, benefactor countries earn more
international prestige and support in their further diplomatic bids and initiatives.
The national interest debate may be considered a major factor in defining and
8) Two reports by official discussion groups present a good explanation of the Japanese national
interest in the diplomacy and particularly in connection with aid: Discussion over the concept of Japan
in the 21st Century, 〝Chapter 6 Japan in the World", The Japar,間e舟ontiers are in Japan- a New World
built on self-reliance and governance; or Panel Discussion over the ODA Reforms for the 21st Century.
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determining Japanese aid policies in the 1990s. This paper suggests herein that it has
the strongest influence among the three factors listed above. The explanatory power of
foreign pressure declined during the 1990s. Additionally, internal pressure, although a
powerful motor for deciding aid policies, can be considered as a rather background or
secondary factor, especially in the Eastern European case. The rational actor model
tends to support the idea that national interest is a major influence, and through the
next section the author tries to prove this presumption.
Among the several aspects of national interests, the enlightened and the political
ones seem to be the best to rationalize aid towards Eastern Europe. This tendency is
a reflection of the immense changes in Japanese aid policies through the 1980s and
1990s, when the political and strategic use of aid became superficially clear. Having
previously emphasized its economic goals in the wake of the new international system,
Japan distinguished the economic from the political and started to show the behavior
of a rational actor, taking into consideration all the sides of its interest and focusing
increasingly on strategic and political goals (Yasutomo, 1995) .
2. Japanese Aid for Eastern Europe: why does it matter?
In this section, the main justification of the argument will be unveiled-namely, it will
analyze the primary goals, objectives and motive of Japan's participation in the
development and reconstruction of the region. As it has been inferred in the previous
section, the mam argument will be based on the rational actor model and it will reflect
the Japanese national interest debate in the 1990s. This paper will examine through
practical examples the meaning and benefits for Japan from the aid disbursed that
justify Japanese behavior as a rational actor. These include economic interests and the
search for new markets, the EU factor and the mutual regional involvement over
security issues, a proactive international role for Japan and the gaining of political
power and prestige, and finally its enlightened participation in world affairs.
9 ) Considering the shifts and reforms of the Japanese aid policies through the decades, refer the work of
Yasutomo 1995).
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2.1 Economic interests-benefiting Japanese companies and new markets?
The question of Japan's economic interest in Eastern Europe is an important issue,
but yet it has not been researched thoroughly. So far there is only one work by
Kemchi Ohmae that argues clearly about the importance and practical charm of
Eastern European countries (Ohmae, 2005).
The uniqueness of Japanese ODA towards Eastern Europe was emphasized oy the
remoteness of the region and its low strategic value. One could back up this
assumption further with more data about the small role this region played compared
to the economic and trade scale of Japan (Nikkeichou, 1992, pp255-256; Keizai
Douyukai, 1991, pp2-3) . The size of each country's market could also be considered
small m comparison to those of certain Asian countries, although some analyses
(Kitamura, 1993, p9; Keizai Douyukai, 1991, pp6-10) have claimed that the whole
economic area covering a population of 120 million people, with its traditional relations
with West Europe and Russia, could be an attractive market with vast opportunities.
In addition to the low trade share, one could indicate the generally low consumption
capacity and purchasing power of the population over the region m the early 1990s,
despite the diversity of incomes per capita throughout the different countries.
Ohmae, however, has argued that the Eastern Europe region has much more to offer
than had been previously estimated, including several important factors that could
represent attractive requisites for Japanese companies, targeting Eastern European
markets (Ohmae, 2005, ppbl-71). One of the first requisites is related to the orighality
and essence of the EU project that was to provide freedom of movement for people,
capital, goods and services, or a unitary market with common rules and freedoms for
all citizens of the EU. As far as the countries that join the EU are concerned, this
literally means no taxes and custom checks at the borders,.which enables promptness
of delivery and easy access to any part of Europe. As for candidate countries or those
that have agreements for customs union with the EU, the procedures at checkpoints
have been completely simplified. Should production be carried out inside a member or
candidate country of the EU, Japanese companies would benefit from easy mobility of
10) According to these studies in the early 1990s Japanese agencies were examining the possibility of
offering aid to Eastern Europe. It was indicated that the export and import to Eastern Europe equated
to just 0.3% of the general value for Japan.
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their goods, with only minimal procedures and bureaucratic hindrances.
Another merit of Eastern European countries could be the opportunity to reduce
companies expenses by inland production and taxes cuts. A common tax has been
imposed on ready production from outside the EU for all the member-countries, whose
value is considerably high in order to protect domestic production. In other words, if
Japanese companies import parts for particular goods, whose tax is estimated to lie
within the range of zero to 4% of the original value, and construct the goods inland,
they would save a lot more should these taxes be cut, because custom taxes on ready
goods produced m the member countries are subject to practically no charge (Ohmae,
2005, p64).
One cannot omit the fact that in comparison to other developing regions, the region
of Eastern Europe has a strong primary base to advance towards a capitalistic
economy and market based policies. By many indexes such as educational level, labor
resources, and cultural and social axioms, the Eastern European countries have shown
excellent capabilities and an ability to adapt and rapidly understand the values of
democracy, freedom, free competition, market economy, etc. (Nikkeichou, 1992, p6). In
this sense, these economies are often regarded as 'transitional'rather than 'developing
ones.
Another important factor of interest for Japanese companies is the agency of the
worker-consumer. On one hand, the labor cost or salary level in Eastern Europe is still
considered very low in comparison with other regions (Ohmae, 2005, p62). The author
argues, however, that in the midterm, it may be expected that the salary level,
especially in those countries that joined the EU in　2004, will go up steadily.
Consequently, the citi云ens of the new member countries will have more demands and
seek greater purchasing power in the future. The Eastern European market may be a
target not for quantity, but for quality, or not for the number of consumers, but for
the purchasing'power of the consumers (Nikkeichou, 1992, p6).
Ohmaes analysis was published in 2005, but there are some reports by JICA and
other research institutes or groups like Japan Association of Corporate Executives
(Keizai Douyukai) and Japan Economic Research Institute (Nihon Keizai Chousa
Kyougikai, abbr. Nikkeichou) that hint at the necessity for Japan to explore the
possibility of developing the Eastern European market. According to some of these
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studies, a pure marketization comes when the private flows and enterprises enter the
economy. Through investment, their own activity or merger with local companies,
these enterprises contribute to the sustainability of the economy and the -market
(Nikkeichou, 1992). Prior to this, however, there should exist a comparably stable
political and economic environment with a favorable investment climate and a low level
of risk for the enterprise. The Japanese government was expected to provide these
necessary conditions by giving aid to particular countries, by signing necessary
agreements for smoother advancement, and so on, in order to open the way for private
enterprises and companies (Keizai Douyukai, 1991).
As far as the Eastern European case is particularly concerned, in the early 1990s, a
large share of the companies did not evaluate the situation in Eastern Europe as
economically or politically stable or free, which explains the small proportion of them
actually having invested in the region. Indeed, asked what the main requirements
towards the Eastern European countries were, most of the companies answered in the
same order　- legal system and provisions, economic stability, political stability,
education of managerial staff and specialists, and the infrastructure. In answer to a
question of what the demands towards the Japanese government were, the majority of
companies confidently replied that these included an agreement for investment
protection, the establishment of a stable system for aid and financial support for the
respective countries, and an amplification of international trade insurance (Keizai
Douyukai, 1991, ppb-10). To summarize briefly, there were many more obstacles the
Japanese companies met in their advancement in Eastern Europe that include political
instability, accumulated debt and lack of foreign currency, communications and
transportation, undeveloped basic infrastructure, difficulties in obtaining accurate
information, a lack of understanding of the market economy principles, a lack of
specialists, the strong influence remaining from the socialist system, commercial risks,
the threat of inflation, and the threat of ethnic confrontation and conflicts, amongst
others (Keizai Douyukai, 1991, pp23-24). The main pillars of Japanese aid towards
Eastern Europe tried to respond to these shared concerns of the Japanese companies.
Satoh stated that in -recent years the close relationship between the government and
Japanese companies had lost its strength (Satoh, 1992, ppl0-ll). On a number of
occasions, such as in the case of Eastern Europe, the expectations of the government
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differed from the actions of companies following their own interests. In this sense, in
the early 1990s, despite the high anticipations of the Japanese government for broader
and stronger participation of the Japanese companies in the reconstruction and
marketization of former communist countries, as well as further investments, the
Japanese enterprises indicated limited interest and investment, in contrast to those
from America or Western Europe. The fault in the process may be due to the
bureaucratic hindrances among the ministries and agencies and the low guarantees and
insurance the latter had given to the Japanese enterprises. In this context, the author
concludes that Japanese ODA m its turn had the task to provide a favorable climate
for the advancement of foreign companies, with the main focus on Japanese
enterprises, which with further investment, joint ventures and independent activity
could help the economies of Eastern Burope to achieve stability (Nikkeichou, 1992). It
may be speculated that the ultimate purpose is the national interest of Japan, to
enrich its own companies and revive its own economic growth. Eventually, however,
due to these certain tendencies m the relations between the Japanese government and
the companies, the ODA disbursed to the countries of Eastern Europe may be
considered rather as a basis for strengthening relations in the future. This, however,
does not exclude the possibility of benefiting Japanese companies in the longer term.
In conclusion, the author herein claims that despite some serious grounds in
believing that Japanese ODA towards this region is provoked by the desire to benefit
Japanese companies and the search for new markets, it would be too bold to claim this
was the central motive of the Japanese government. The Japanese aid towards Eastern
Europe may be a good way of producing a favorable environment and lowering the
risk for Japanese companies. In order to achieve this, however, the original motive of
Japanese aid passes through other considerations-overall political and economic
stabilization-which was a major requirement according to Japanese companies.
2.2 The European Union factor-a new global player and the stake of KEDO?
In the previous section, the economic justification of Japanese aid was examined as
one of the primary motives of foreign aid towards Eastern Europe. As was pointed out
in the first section, the definition of Japans national interests not only concerns its
economic profits, but also involves security aspects, both regionally and globally. In
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this section, the author discusses the security dimension of Japan's national interests
through the EU-Japan relations.
In the last decade, some innovative studies such as that of Julie Gilson examined the
political aspect of EU-Japan relations (Gilson, 2000). The reason for this new stream of
research lies in the fact that since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a shared
enthusiasm for building a political dialogue between these two major actors, which
could facilitate the framework for straightening the economic friction ahead, and work
for their mutual interest in various spheresll
As far as our research question is concerned, there are several points of speculation
one can put forward m the debate. First of all, Japans efforts and financial support
towards the region of Eastern Europe can be interpreted as an attempt to enhance its
relations with Western Europe through these acts of cooperation. As stated above, the
growing importance of the EU m the international arena could be foreseen in the early
1990s, and made it essential for Japan to reevaluate its diplomatic course towards
Europe (Yasutomo, 1995, pill, pl24).
The correlation between the security and stability of Eastern Europe and the overall
security of Europe is quite clear. In helping the European Union, which is the leading
initiator for aid towards Eastern Europe, Japan would gain political credit and
bargaining power for its future relations with the region as a whole (Nikkeichou, 1992,
pp8-9). There also exist deeper roots to the Japanese financial assistance, which date
back to when aid was not given specifically to Eastern Europe, but to Greece or
Portugal (JICA Annual Reports). However, Japan has never answered as eagerly to
international call as to the one from the EU countries for rebuilding the region of
Eastern Europe. The Japanese participation m this aid initiative may be considered
more planned, more strategic and more grounded by the rules of the post Cold War
period.
In the early 1990s when attention was focused on Eastern Europe, Japan was
concerned about the mam course of developments in the. region and their global
impact. The great change of 1989 brought insecurity for the future not only in Europe
ll) The first steps towards this goal were the epochal visits by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to Europe in
early 1990, and the visit of the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors to Japan in May
1991. These led to the Hague Declaration in the year 1991, which is recognized to be the starting point
of the Japan-EU active political dialogue aiming at stronger future relations.
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but across the whole world, particularly in Asia (Yasutomo, 1995, pll7) . Japan's main
anxiety at this time was the eventual regression and reversion of Eastern European
countries to communism13', which could ultimately rehabilitate the former strength of
communism as an ideology, especially in respect to the Asian region where communism
still existed in China, North Korea, and Vietnam, among others.
In addition, another factor has often been pointed out as a reason for Japanese aid
towards Eastern Europe. The contemporary world of interdependence led to the
processes of mutual involvement of big powers into their respective regions, as well as
the internationalization of any internal or external problems of middle or large scale.
Through the 1990s, the troubled regions required and received broader publicity and
international reaction led by institutions like the UN, the World Bank, IMF, and
OSCE, among others. This has led Japan to the idea of further cooperation with
counterparts or major players m other regions. The Hague Declaration of 1991 between
the EU and Japan refers also particularly to plans of ''strengthening the cooperation
withm international organizations- (Hague Declaration, 1991).
In this context, the insecurity relating to the situation in the fast developing. Asian
region provoked Japan to question the sufficiency of the guarantees given by the U.S.
Japan considered it necessary to find another counterpart for mutual regional
involvement. Through the 1990s, the most secure and stable player among the other
powers was the union of European countries, with its "soft power" potential and
international credit. Only the EU members together had military and economical
capabilities and an influential political voice close to or equal to those of the U.S. In
this respect, Japan had found merit to invest m the European prosperity and security
in return for EU participation at times when there were international or local issues
in the Asian region (PKO Oraru Histon Shirhzu, 2005, ppl8-20; Hiraiwa and others,
1992, p16)1'
Although the government, aid agencies and many scholars mention these kinds of
measures m annual reports, some critics say that interregional involvement is not
12) See the citation of a statement by Prime Minister Kaifu.
13) Such explanation was also given during the interviews with Japanese officials (4-5 June, 2005)
14) As the former Ambassador Kuriyama, a foreign policy advisor in the early 1990s, says in the cited
work, Japan has given considerable attention and financial support, because it was necessary to
reciprocate Europe s attention towards Asia.
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quite so active . The author argues, however, that such a point should be reevaluated.
Japan holds an observer seat in organizations like OSCE, and participated actively in
G24; dialogues have also been initiated in recent years between Asia and Europe such
as ASEM, and dialogues between the EU and ASEAN, or participation of both in ARF
(Gilson, 2000, ppl21-122). A clear example of efforts being made on interdependence
projects is the EU participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) in return for Japanese participation in the Eastern Europe
reconstruction
The EU joined KEDO in September 1997, with representation on the Executive Board
for a term to coincide with its substantial and sustained support. This European
initiative is often seen as reciprocation of the Japanese diplomatic and financial
contribution to international aid after the Dayton agreement for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) (Gilson, 2000, ppl31-132). Japan has also become a member of the
Steering Committee of the Peace Implementation Council in BiH, and in turn, the EU
extended its membership in KEDO for another five years and increased its annual
contribution from 15 to 20 million Euros in December 2001. In 1997 Poland also joined
KEDO, and the Czech Republic became a member in 1999. This could account for the
comparative effect of the regional interdependence policies of Japan and the
reasonability of aid towards Eastern European countries such as Poland and the Czech
Republic.
In conclusion, the author suggests herein that the EU factor plays an essential role
in the reasoning behind Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe, especially in the
circumstances of the contemporary post Cold War era. It is not an exaggeration to say
that the EU factor・ is a strong impulse provoking Japanese aid towards Eastern
Europe, with the final goal of strengthening the EU-Japan relations and the mutual
regional involvement, as well as gaining credit for future economic or political
developments.
Nevertheless, many scholars omit this factor in their studies, giving more room to
the economic interest and the international responsibility of Japan. Some other studies,
?????????????
A point of criticism during the interviews with Japanese officials (4-5 July, 2005).
For more information on KEDO refer to: http://www.kedo.org/index.asp (last access: 15/05/2006)
On a bilateral basis EU has engaged not only in the Korean peninsula but also in Cambodia or the
development of Mongolia (Gilson, 2000, plO8).
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meanwhile, mention it vaguely without thorough examination of the bilateral EU-
Japan relations and the progressing tendency of interdependence between the European
and Asian regions. This ignorance of the EU factor is understandable, as far as it is
often engulfed in the bigger framework of rapidly changing international relations and
the growing need for Japan's more pro-active participation in the international arena
with bigger and more complex responsibilities. In this respect, the relations between
the EU and Japan are part of the complicated puzzle of contemporary international
relations rather than merely being a single factor. This larger framework, however,
will be the main subject of the next section.
2.3 New internationalism and a proactive role for Japan?
As discussed above, the economic interest and the security considerations are
powerful motors for policies including foreign aid. Herein, however, the author argues
that Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe, extends to greater and more compound
rationales, and brings a clearly expressed new dimension to Japanese diplomacy, based
on enlightened and political national interests. The reason for such a conclusion is that
the former two types of interests can be thought as not having priority and great
strategic significance at the time of commencing the aid. The expectation span for
results out of these policies can also be related to longer terms. Briefly observing the
results at present, one still cannot see an overwhelming advancement of Japanese
enterprises m Eastern Europe; neither can one see a significantly improved import-
export balance or trade growth between the region and Japan. Additionally, the EU-
Japan relations, albeit promoted broadly, are in stagnation, whereas Japan still
heavily relies on U.S. support.
This paper asserts that by the late 1980s and during the 1990s, Japan clearly linked
its aid to broader global issues and strategic goals. In such a way, Japan showed signs
of enhanced participation in world developments and a more pro-active political role in
contrast with its reactive past (Yasutomo, 1995; Collection of Speeches by Prime
Minister Kaifu). This can be particularly said about the aid given to regions beyond
traditional interest such as that of Eastern Europe.
The clear explicit development of the political dimension of the Japanese national
interest debate coincided with the system change and revolutions in Eastern Europe.
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During his government, Prime Minister Kaifu (1989-91) stated political goals that
paralleled the Western ideas: democratization, a multiparty political system, rule of
law and human rights, and market economies. The prime minister extended this
political conditionality to all Japanese ODA policies, foreshadowing the clear
realization of these intentions-the creation of a new Japanese aid philosophy or the
ODA Charter (Yasutomo, 1995, pllO).
Through the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the world was shaken by great changes
and shifts in international relations, and so-called global issues came to the surface. To
cope with such new risks, Japan had to embrace initiatives of improving the world
environment and stabilizing the overall political and economic situation for the
common interest (Speeches by Prime Minister Hashimoto). Although its aid continued
to be mainly focused towards Asia, Japan looked beyond these borders and involved
itself in other regions and areas out of traditional interest (Yasutomo, 1995, ppl0-16,
pill). The motives were clear, expanding from the mere national interest of a bigger
trading nation-being highly dependent on the welfare of global community and a
healthy economic climate-going through the desire for a better political position in
international relations by gaining political credit and prestige, to pure perception of
interdependence and will for enlightened involvement into all regions in trouble, being
a responsible member of the international society and an economic power per se.
Never before had Japan tried harder to fulfill its duties as an enthusiastic member
of the wealthy club of the Western nations'' and a responsible leader of an
international community (Nikkeichou, 1992, pp7-10). It may be said that, during the
1990s, Japan started its bid for recognition as a global power in terms of international
relations, and that it made many efforts to settle its proactive role in global initiatives
with its own agenda and ideas (Yasutomo, 1995). It tried to reconfirm its prestige of
being a caring, friendly nation, and to broaden its influence among aid-receiving states
(JICA Institute for International Cooperation, 2003b, p20).
These conclusions may be supported by the case of Eastern European aid as well.
Some Japanese government officials define aid towards Eastern Europe as a mere
reaction to the rapid changes in the international environment in the early 1990s.
However, this most likely was the beginning, or at least part of, the global
involvement of Japan in further stabilizing the various regions in trouble and in facing
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diverse problems. Provided that Japan could not use full military potential abroad"
limited by its peaceful constitution, and its public opinion would most probably oppose
any non-strategic and heavy dispatch of self-defense forces outside the country, the
only way that it could contribute to remote regions such as Eastern Europe would be
a reasonable and planned disbursement of economic assistance.
It could be inferred that the aid was directed towards economic development and
stability of the region because of its highly economical character. The aid, however,
was very much aimed at bringing political stability, which is an indispensable
condition for further sustainable economic development. Creating politically resistant
and economically steady countries in Eastern Europe would be of greater benefit for
the world's economy and political well-being.
Apart from the pure responsibility as a member of the developed countries, Japan
had to follow another agenda as a caring member of the international society.
Japanese aid towards diverse countries has been often said to create amiable relations
with the countries concerned, and that could eventually support Japan-led initiatives
internationally and provide favorable conditions for Japanese companies domestically.
This assumption indicates the efforts Japan makes to play a larger role in the
international arena in trying to obtain more political influence.
Simple examples that may be examined are the case of the Kyoto Protocol and the
Japanese bid for a seat in the Security Council of the UN. Japan and the EU were the
mam supporters of the Protocol among the highly developed countries, and Japan was
also an enthusiastic agitator and used its influence to promote the ratification of the
agreement with other countries. In the case of Eastern Europe, all the countries, except
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, have signed and ratified the document. Another
example of Japanese initiatives is its bid for a permanent seat in the SC. Although
this case does not apply particularly to the countries of Eastern Europe, by providing
aid to the region, Japan gains not only the support of the countries of Eastern
Europe, it also receives the sympathy of the other major countries of the EU and
especially from the permanent members France and Britain and the other candidate,I-111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111T
18) For more details on the responsibilities and activities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during Peace
Keeping Operations (PKO) refer the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping and
Other Operations (June 19, 1992).
A Study on the Factors Explaining the Japanese Aid towards Eastern Europe　　　375
Germany. Eastern Europe has considerable weight in the SC, because one seat for non-
permanent member is provisional for the region. Along with creating friendly relations
with the European countries, the aid will represent good credit for the future efforts
of Japan to achieve its goal.
Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe may be also seen as fulfillment of
responsibilities to which Japan has been bonded by its membership and donations to
major organizations and formations. Among these, one should mention the G7 (8)
meeting, where at the Arch Meeting in Paris in 1989, the strongest economies in the
world took an initiative to aid the economies in transition in Eastern Europe. Other
organizations, in which Japanese government took part, are IMF, WB, EBRD, and
G24, which play an essential role in the economic development of the target countries.
In our case, the EBRD in particular plays a crucial role in the transition of Eastern
Europe (Yasutomo, 1995, pplO2-118).
Another point of discussion is the participation of Japan m the reconstruction and
peace building in areas of conflict. Bound by its peaceful constitution, the mam
contribution of Japan can be through aid and financial support for reconstruction,
healing the consequences of the conflict. In the case of Yugoslavia, Japan contributed
with plenty of aid grants in the form of food and emergency aid, which did not have
to be rationalized since this aid was part of an international initiative of global
proportions. It was an act of international involvement that could satisfy the
international community by fulfilling its duty, and satisfying public opinion by
keeping its actions within the principles of the constitution in achieving humanitarian
goals (JICA Institute for International Cooperation, 2003b, pl9).
Conclusion
This paper's main point of justification of the rational actor model rested on the
suggestion that the main motive of Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe is finding a
more proactive role for Japan in the international arena through aid contribution as
a bargaining and diplomatic tool for achieving strategic goals. Limited by its peaceful
constitution, Japan seeks a way to increase its influence and international voice by
means of aid and economic cooperation. The significance of the aid towards Eastern
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Europe is that it seeks international support for Japan in its bids and initiatives,
prestige and the image of a responsible member of the community-all these having
implications for national interests and for future actions in a broad international
context. In this sense, this aid is a clear example of the increased strategic and
political objectives of Japanese aid diplomacy. The political and enlightened dimensions
of the national interest have proved their growing importance in the Japanese aid
diplomacy agenda. Specifically in the case of Eastern Europe, they can be referred to
as the mam rationales for determining aid policie岳towards the region.
It would, however, be rather premature to end the discussion at this point. Even
though the leading rationale of Japanese aid towards Eastern Europe may be
considered to be its new internationalism and proactive political role, the aid is
multifaceted and has compound purposes. It can be argued that it is better to regard
Japanese economic interests and the EU factor as essential, rather than to blindly
ignore them. As was discussed earlier in the previous section, there are many
indicators that support these two rationales of Japanese aid.
This paper's main task was identifying the determining factors for Japanese aid
towards Eastern Europe. The author argues herein that the national interest debate
has had the strongest influence among other essential factors that concern aid policies
through the late 1980s and during the 1990s. The foreign pressure factor, albeit a
significant force during the Cold War period, has been overshadowed by the national
interest debate in the 1990s. Its weakening power can be predicted due to the growing
independence of Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, the increasing importance
of the internal pressure factor has been demonstrated, especially in the 1990s. In the
case of Eastern Europe, however, the role of the Japanese public is rather unclear, and
it would be inaccurate to claim that the public was the main proponent for the aid
towards the region.
The central role of the national interest debate is the concluding point of our debate.
It can be unfolded in several directions. First of all, the national interest debate was
an interesting development in the late 1980s and 1990s. The -ignorance- of the Japanese
national interest'questioned the rationality of Japanese foreign policy for many years;
during which foreign pressure was recognized to have played the most significant role.
The dynamism of international relations after 1989　brought about the explicit
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verbalization of national interests in public.
Second, there came the necessity to look through the national interest debate as an
explanatory framework for the aid policies of Japan. Many authors through the 1990s
still relied heavily on the foreign pressure debate when they tried to examine the
factors concerning the aid policies. The foreign pressure explanation, however, does not
fit the new realities of the post Cold War period very well, and it tends to leave many
questions unanswered.
Third, Japanese national interest has been discussed by a number of authors and it
has been brought into public debate in the 1990s. The thorough observation of its
different aspects, however, has been neglected, and only an economic, negative image of
this factor has been broadly examined. Many have, not taken into close consideration
the positive gains for the political and enlightened interest of Japan, coming from the
aid. This paper has emphasized the importance of these two aspects of the national
interest and it has tried to present some more alternatives in the economically centered
debate over Japanese aid. The case of Eastern Europe is a good example in this
direction, where deep economic interests cannot be detected.
The Japanese ODA reforms in accordance with the national interest debate in the
1990s, the separation of the economic from the political, and the growing importance
of political agenda and goals in the aid policies have already been emphasized in the
aid studies of the 1990s (Yasutomo, 1995). Most academics, however, have omitted an
outstanding argumentative case that gives evidence to such processes - namely, that of
Eastern Europe. The case of Eastern Europe has helped to prove that Japan has
shown the behavior of a rational player in the international arena, following and
expressing its national interests explicitly in its own original agenda. Through our
case, its national interest has been proved to have much more importance in the
present aid policymaking than the external and internal pressure - a tendency that has
been ignored in the aid studies in the 1990s. Despite the fact that this article touched
upon only the explicit cases of aid towards Eastern Europe and its rationales, the
author claims herein that the aid towards other diverse regions should be also closely
reevaluated in the light of the rational actor model. This could provide clearer and
more profound understanding of Japanese aid objectives and rationales in the new
international context after the changes of 1989.
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